Qualitative research and ethnographic observations were used in this study to document daily practices of livestock market actors and public service providers. Using 46 interviews and 7 FGDs with various market actors, the loosening of State regulations and deliberate rule breaking signified the blind eye of the State that breeds the observed multiple institutional political order. It will be shown that the malpractices of informal taxation by civil servants is not new to the market actors in Garissa and is perceived as a survival mechanism in their routine interactions in various State departments. Market access is very important to the traders at Garissa and are ready to negotiate with legal officers and even postpone informal taxes paid for uncertain services. The same malpractices have delineated actors according to those specialized in local network of subsistence and the export value chain network that is highly commercialized and dominated by powerful resilient traders. Literature reveals that such interactions of State officials with actors in the other value chain networks have produced a hybrid political order, and the decision making process seems to be alternatives induced by informal institutional arrangements. The practical norms emerging from how Somalis purchase, trek and transport animals to destined abattoirs along Somali-Kenya transboundary corridor were analyzed to gauge their strength in persuading future policy reforms for regional trade integration. The research is contributing to State building debates by providing evidence on the role of real market practices in constructing State effect, and it will acknowledge that local and export livestock value chains governance differ in the attempts to influence Statehood.
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RUFORUM Working document series
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